

"SADAT, CARTER, BEGIN: AN UNEQUALLY SIDED TRIANGLE"

PROF. KENNETH STEIN

Note: This article was originally prepared for publication in the *Camp David Process*, published by the Menachem Begin Heritage Center, Jerusalem, 2002, pp. 32-42. With very few changes, the article was slightly amplified and minor corrections made.

There are several caveats to my presentation. There is a tendency amongst those of us who deal with important politicians and with political leaders to overstate their importance to history. It is a hazard of ours to create a myth about how important these figures were and, about how few mistakes they made. We tend to overstate their successes; we understate their shortcomings. We tend to view their time on this planet as being extra special, in part because we served them or worked with them. But they are human beings; they do make mistakes. Sometimes they acknowledge their own errors, more often they do not, particularly as they get further away from the events in which they were central participants. We as historians who also work with these people, sometimes fail to be candid about the principals we served.

That's the number one caveat. So when I speak about Sadat, Carter and Begin, I am not here to create idolatry for any one of the three of them. I am here as a person who saw the three of them through the eyes of a former U.S. president in his post-presidency, as an American historian of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and as a researcher on the topic. My findings for this paper come as an offshoot from ten years of research focusing on Arab-Israeli negotiations in the 1970s. That culminated in my book, *Heroic Diplomacy: Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace* (Routledge, 1999), and its Hebrew edition, *Mediniut Amitza [Courageous Policy]* (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense Publishing House, 2003). Most important for writing this article were the impressions and recollections culled from interviews completed with dozens of American, Jordanian, Israeli, Palestinian and Syrian diplomats, policy-makers, and bureaucrats associated with the conflict in that decade.

The second point that I'd really like to make to you is not only on what I say about Sadat, Carter and Begin and their relationships, but to think also about Arafat, Barak and Clinton, and their relationships. Think about the personalities; think

about their characteristics; think about whether there is any kind of analogy that is worth making. Could, in fact, people make history or does history make men or women? Could, in fact, Ronald Reagan have conducted Camp David in 1978? Could in fact, someone like Hosni Mubarak have gone to Jerusalem? Could, in fact, someone like Yitzhak Shamir have embraced Hosni Mubarak with Ronald Reagan to create the triangular relationship? Was this just a unique time when three people got together when the constellations of history just happened to be at that eclipse that comes every three hundred years? The argument in my book (*Heroic Diplomacy*) is that this happened to be just one of those very special moments. It might not be duplicated; whether it was the “ripeness” of the moment or whether it was the individuals. What we do know about the four people about whom I wrote—Kissinger, Sadat, Carter and Begin—is that they all had vision. They all understood how to connect tactics with strategy. They all were very good politicians. They all understood their domestic constituencies, and, yet, they were willing to break with tradition in order to reach beyond that particular moment. All of them, all of them twisted the truth. They did it for their own reasons; they did it consistently; and they did it for a purpose. To say that any one of the four of them was a saint is to create a myth.

Let me turn for a moment to Sadat, move over to Begin, talk about Carter next, and then speak about their relationships. Camp David would not have happened if there had not been Anwar Sadat, because the trip to Jerusalem wouldn't have happened. Anwar Sadat was singly most important for the breakthrough between Egypt and Israel that took place between 1973 and 1979. I put more stock in Anwar Sadat's vision, boldness, and courage than I do in any of the other leaders. That is, after working for fifteen years with President Jimmy Carter. It is not meant in any way to negate the importance played by either Begin or Carter. Sadat possessed one unalterable objective. He didn't have fossilized ideologies. He was a strong patriot, who had a capacity for reaching his objective, and that single goal was the return of Sinai. He was going to accomplish that no matter what it took. He was never willing to share all of his information with all of his advisors. He was never hesitant to take a bold initiative. He was, for many Arabs, Israelis and Americans, coming after Nasser, a strange breed, a political oxymoron. Nasser was embedded in absolute ideology. How could it be possible that an Arab, let alone an Egyptian, would seek to make an agreement with Israel? That was a deeply held view by both American and Israeli policy-makers in the wake of the October 1973 War. Sadat was a tactician and he was a strategist. In managing Israel, his Arab peers, his economy, and the superpowers, his policies were always in process. Sadat was

not wedded to a particular ideology. Therefore, it was extraordinarily difficult for Americans or for Israelis to put their ideological arms around him. Dayan always asked the question: "Can we trust him?" Israelis were never sure. Americans weren't sure. No one was sure about Sadat or where he was going. American policy-makers, especially after his trip to Jerusalem, were on edge about whether at any one moment he would call off the entire effort of trying to retrieve Sinai from the Israelis. This tactic of course, kept Sadat in control of the pace and content of progress. Moreover, Sadat disliked paper work. As much as Begin was the man who understood every word and had a legalistic mind, Sadat disliked the detail. Sadat selectively used words when he wanted to make policy, but he didn't pay particular care to them as much as Begin and Carter did. Sadat was always willing to throw out a whole series of ideas at once to see what would be reaped, what would be caught, who would receive it. He collated responses. Sometimes he acted on them; sometimes he didn't. He never believed what his advisors said, and, yet, he always gave his advisors enough leash that they could fight between themselves. If Israelis were aware of the crusty relationship between Simcha Dinitz and Abba Eban in the Israeli foreign policy arena in 1973-1974, the relationship between Ashraf Gorbali, the Egyptian Ambassador to the U.S. and Ismail Fahmy, the Egyptian Foreign Minister was equally or more discourteous.¹ Sadat knew that there was this tension between Gorbali and Fahmy; he manipulated that tension to keep himself above the fray. He let Fahmy take care of inter-Arab affairs, allowing Gorbali to be his representative to Washington. Sadat kept for himself managing the Arab and Israeli portfolio, while determining Egypt's relationship with the US by his relationship with Nixon, Ford, Carter and their secretaries of state. In his meetings with foreign leaders, he cherished one-on-one sessions, where he rarely included advisers or ministers. When Kissinger met Sadat for the first time in November '73, they talked privately without advisers. This was a terribly important meeting on November 6, 1973. Henry Kissinger came out of this meeting, and said, we have established a notion of somehow reaching a staged disengagement between Israeli and Arab forces. Where did the idea of staged withdrawal come from? Was it Henry's idea that he brought out of this November 6th meeting where he had two and a half hours with Sadat alone? No, it wasn't. It

¹ Tensions or differences of opinion between Carter's National Security Advisor Brzezinski and his Secretary of State Cyrus Vance never reached those levels of down right animosity that existed in either the Israeli or Egyptian bureaucracy at the time.

was an idea that Sadat sent to Washington with Fahmi a week before. Kissinger heard it from Fahmi. How did Kissinger come to the conclusion that the idea of military disengagement would have Israeli consent? It came originally from the Israeli prime minister herself who relayed the idea to General Aharon Yariv who discussed it with Egyptian General Gamassy on October 29th and 30th at the Kilometer 101 talks. Meir already had disengagement in mind prior to the onset of those talks. The entire history of “step-by-step” diplomacy, while articulated by Kissinger, came originally from Meir via Yariv to Gemasy, to Sadat to Fahmi to Kissinger. Sadat dictated a memo to Fahmi prior to his departure for Washington during the first days of November. This was typical of Sadat. He did not take credit for the staged withdrawal that Kissinger would fashion in detail; he let Kissinger emerge with that idea. And Meir never claimed it as her own, knowing full well that Kissinger and the U.S. needed to be at the take-off of the negotiating process, and staged withdrawal would be the only way she could be sure that her Israeli prisoner’s of war would be returned from Egypt while Israel controlled the future of the surrounded Third Army. Sadat needed to have Kissinger “save” the Third Army. He too wanted to be at center stage. Sadat’s broader goal: harness American engagement, let Washington pry Sinai loose from Israeli control, and if he and Egypt had to sign an agreement to make that happen, he would do that. As I emphasize to my students and emphasized in *Heroic Diplomacy*, Sadat did not want peace with Israel. He needed an agreement with Israel, because he wanted to change Egypt's direction. He wanted Sinai back. Period.

Sadat was an actor who believed in grand gestures, and he expected others to be equally dramatic. He met with Begin at Ismaliya in December of 1977 and expected Begin to say, ‘yes, I shall withdraw from all of Sinai, not a problem, and all the settlements there will go too.’ Instead, Begin offered him autonomy for the Palestinians. Herman Eilts, the U.S. Ambassador who was in Cairo at the time, took notes. Sadat said something to the effect of: "what is this guy doing? He is a merchant. He is peddling me notions. I just recognized his existence, and now, he is going to give the Palestinians a little of this and a little of that." That kind of crustiness became typical of the Begin-Sadat relationship. Relayed to Washington, the Carter Administration, still flustered and still recovering from Sadat’s unexpected visit to Jerusalem, began to shift from focusing on seeking a comprehensive peace through a comprehensive means —convening a Middle East Peace Conference –to focusing on how to keep Sadat tuned into reaching an agreement, even if only a bilateral one with Israel. Slowly, the Carter

Administration cranked up its response of intervening actively to keep Egypt and Israel talking.

One of the advantages for the negotiating process was that Sadat was a man in a hurry. He was impatient. He wanted results. He kept his eye on the objective, and he essentially made Kissinger and Carter, both in their times, “his” ambassador to Israel. Still in the cold war, the United States did not want to lose Anwar Sadat. Prying him loose from the Soviet grip remained a core foreign policy objective of U.S. administrations. In the end, Sadat’s full embrace of the United States was, perhaps, the single greatest victory for the United States in the Cold War. It came voluntarily. It came because Sadat wanted it, and the U.S. took advantage of his tilt toward Washington and away from Moscow. Coming after Vietnam, Henry Kissinger wanted it and needed it. Jimmy Carter wanted it and needed it.

Let me move on to a discussion of Menachem Begin. Sadat and Begin had a similarity in the sense that they both followed, or they both lived in the shadow of very strong political leaders. Sadat lived in the shadow of Nasser; Begin, of course, always lived in Ben-Gurion’s shadow. For Begin, the PLO was an anathema. He always believed its goal was to destroy the State of Israel. He was consumed with Jewish history. He was defensive about anyone who wanted to impugn Israeli legitimacy and as Yechiel Kadishai (Begin's personal assistant) told me on more than one occasion, he only asked one question. The bottom line for him in making policy choices was: “Is it good or bad for the Jewish people?” Begin wanted to apply Israeli sovereignty over all of the West Bank, but he accepted Dayan’s compromise, “not to allow foreign sovereignty” over Judea and Samaria. Begin signed a document that spoke about legitimate rights for the Palestinians. It was an ideological compromise that he made. Begin did not have his arm twisted by Jimmy Carter; he knew he needed to keep open the question of Israel’s future annexation of the territories so that Sadat and the Americans would have something to crave for in the negotiations. Moreover, Begin needed to buy time in order to test Sadat’s intentions. Foreclosing on the future of Judea and Samaria would have made it difficult if not impossible for Sadat to solidify the peace treaty with Israel. Begin knew that. He knew he had to postpone the future disposition of Judea and Samaria; that is why he offered full autonomy to the Palestinians.

Dr. Eliyahu Ben-Elissar, the Director-General of Menachem Begin's office, remarked in an interview with me that “Begin did not like the Palestinian homeland statement. None of us liked it. We resented it. In fact, we hated it. Begin

considered it a major shift in U.S. policy.”² At the time, Begin was privy to Israeli intelligence estimates, which suggested very rough times ahead in the U.S.-Israeli relationship. This was just prior to the July 1977 visit, by which time Begin understood that Jimmy Carter was not Henry Kissinger. He was not a man who was going to keep diplomacy or discussions private. Carter had a tendency to wear his foreign policy in the open. He was the antithesis of Kissinger’s obsession with secrecy. Jimmy Carter said everything out loud. He said it in public and shocked people. He stood up in Clinton, Massachusetts in March of 1977, and said that he believed that the Palestinian refugees should have a homeland. It wasn’t in the prepared text. It was part of an answer to a student’s question. Immediately, when Carter finished, he called Brzezinski on the phone and said, ‘I don’t want anyone correcting what I said. I don’t want anyone going on TV. I don’t want anyone going on the media saying I didn’t mean what I said.’ Carter’s statement sent shock waves through Israel and rippled heavily through the American Jewish community. A Palestinian homeland was viewed as analogous to a homeland of the Jewish people, “the Balfour Declaration.” Did Carter know what he was saying? Because any time an American puts a word, phrase, or a comma in the wrong place, Israelis gasp, they hiccup; because words matter. They matter dramatically. When you talk about the term, “specific” in the phrase “specific withdrawal” as appeared in the Camp David accords, it suggests a precise withdrawal. The English original says “withdrawal,” while the Hebrew translation is “a specific withdrawal [*nesigah mesuyemet*]”. Why? Because Begin wanted to show that he was not withdrawing from all but only a specified area. Begin, like Carter, understood word meaning and usage. Each left Camp David with the same text, only the Israelis translated it to mean something more limiting.

Begin possessed an extraordinarily analytical mind with a phenomenal memory. Often, I have heard Jimmy Carter speak to my classes. I have heard him speak about the Camp David negotiations. One of many points he consistently makes is that he, Carter, never met a smarter political leader than Begin. But therein was Jimmy Carter’s problem, because Begin immersed himself in every detail. He paid meticulous, if not excessive, attention to specifics. Before he went to Washington in July 1977, he read the cables of Carter’s difficult visit with Rabin the previous March. For Begin, Judea and Samaria were synonymous with the future of the Jewish people. They were not occupied lands. They were liberated

²Kenneth W. Stein, interview with Dr. Eliyahu Ben-Elisar, November 13, 1992, Jerusalem, Israel.

territories. He rejected any territorial compromise, and, for Begin, retaining Judea and Samaria was not a sophisticated negotiation ploy. He had an ideology, and he was not going to bend on that ideology. His ideologies were red lines. Other Israeli politicians have had ideologies that have been pink. They change color. For Begin, retaining Judea and Samaria was his closing position. They are the heart of biblical Israel. They were a part of his fiber. When he spoke about the territories, there was a reverent unshakable attachment. Judea and Samaria were inextricably connected to the renaissance of Zionism and the geography of modern Israel. He carried ideology with him; he took it with him to Camp David; and he came home with it. Begin mistakenly believed that once Carter understood that the Land of Israel had been liberated, he would understand Israel's viewpoint. If Carter could sit down and listen to Begin rationally describe why the Jewish people had the right to possess Judea and Samaria, Carter would understand Begin's logic. Begin operated on the notion that 'if you sit and listen to me, I can persuade you, because I can prove to you why it is important to us. I know why it is important to us.' But it wasn't Carter's willingness to listen that was so important. It was Begin's self-assured ability to pronounce what he wanted. Just because Carter listened to his 45-minute renditions of Zionist history didn't mean that Carter accepted it. And Carter never did.

For Begin, settling in Judea and Samaria was a right; for Carter, the settlements were an obstacle to peace, an obstacle to providing territory for the Palestinians to have their state. And the two never got closer on the issue. Begin understood well before he came to office that there was no such thing as a Jordanian option, of a negotiation with Jordan about the future disposition of Judea, Samaria, or east Jerusalem. Begin had no trouble in understanding or at least accepting Sadat's desire to have his land returned to Egyptian sovereignty. Begin understood what had to be done to achieve an agreement with Egypt. Begin knew before he went to the Camp David Summit in September 1978 that he would have to find a way to make a compromise about settlements in Sinai. Begin understood where present day tactics connected to longer term strategy. In that he was much like Ben-Gurion.

Begin and Sadat had a lot in common: each was a fiercely committed nationalist; each was a proud founding contributor to their country's modern struggle for independence; and each believed in the importance of land and a portion of land as a part of their historical identity, and neither was going to compromise. In a certain sense, that's where Begin and Sadat were similar. They

understood that a piece of territory could not be compromised. For Begin, it was Judea and Samaria. For Sadat, it was Sinai. Begin was willing to say: Sinai for a peace treaty, because it is in the long-term interests of the Jewish people and the State of Israel. Both of them wanted to create their own legitimacy in time because of where they had come in their respective country's history. They could reach an understanding with one another, because they had a specific imperative. They both feared or disliked the Soviet Union; they both wanted to be close to the United States. They had a specific incentive that drove them to reach their treaty in 1979. That specific incentive of trading land for a treaty overlapped with the assistance of the former peanut farmer and former governor of the state of Georgia, Jimmy Carter.

When Carter came to the presidency, he had little knowledge of the Middle East. He had taken a trip there in May of '73. He had met Golda Meir. He went to some of the holy sites. He visited some kibbutzim and visited the Golan Heights. He had a biblical knowledge from his Christian tradition. Sadat was not terribly pleased with Carter's election, but he did indicate to Herman Eilts at one point: Maybe I can trust him, because Carter has a sentimentality about religion. There was also a commonality between Begin, Sadat and Carter: their religiosity. There was a foundation there that underpinned their relationship.

Carter, in preparing for the presidency, brought people down to Plains, Georgia, to interview, to provide background material, to learn about Latin America and arms control, the Soviet Union and the Middle East. So when Carter took office in 1977, his knowledge of the Middle East was not that great. I would argue that U.S. presidents-elect who are former governors - such as FDR, Ronald Reagan, Jimmy Carter, Bill Clinton, and George Bush - when they became president, on the way to becoming president, they have a longer learning curve. It took them longer to learn about foreign affairs than the senators and congressmen, or others from a Washington or international background who have a richer experience with interest groups and foreign affairs before getting to the oval office. In some ways Carter had attributes that were similar to both Begin and Sadat. For Carter and Begin, every word mattered, and that is why they clashed. Carter was like Sadat in that he was in a hurry, time mattered—getting the task completed was part of Carter's fiber. Having worked with him closely from 1983-1993 and then sporadically thereafter, I, like others who have worked for him, know that he does not like to waste time. No grass grows under his feet. You want something done, he figures it can be resolved, and it can be done completely or comprehensively.

President Jimmy Carter never believed that a problem could not be solved. He has an engineer's mentality, which means that if you go at something directly, forcefully, and continuously, you will solve the problem. Forget political idiom. Forget history that can stifle movement forward; you can reach a solution, because reasonable people can come to a conclusion, and it can be done even in a comprehensive manner. What did Jimmy Carter try to do? He tried to resurrect the 1973 Geneva Middle East Peace Conference—the notion of a comprehensive peace achieved in a comprehensive manner—even if meant bringing in the Soviet Union, the ends justified the means. The notion of a comprehensive peace achieved in a comprehensive manner actually pushed Anwar Sadat to go to Jerusalem, because the focus was no longer solely on Egypt. The focus was on the Palestinian participation and endless hours spent in trying to create a united Arab delegation. We can't live on the myth that the U.S.-Soviet declaration drove Sadat to Jerusalem. That's just not the case. Rather, the case was that Jimmy Carter was focused on everything else except Sadat, including the Soviet relationship, PLO representation, and how to bring in Hafez al-Assad and Syria. As Sadat had done all along—by going into the 1973 war and by forcing out the Soviets a year earlier—he was going to do what was necessary to change the status quo, to move things along with Israel. Sadat wasn't going to wait. He was, as his advisers whom I interviewed told me, 'the engine' that kept the process going forward.

There is no doubt that Jimmy Carter was appreciated by Middle Eastern leaders. Dayan and King Hussein, particularly, were impressed with Carter's involvement and knowledge of the issues. For their own separate reasons, both had severe run-ins with Carter, but that did not diminish their praise for him. Dayan remarked in his memoirs that Carter was the central figure and the man who made the decisions. He showed great knowledge of the matters as compared to the knowledge shown by other Americans. He knew the various formulations and where the difficulties lay. He also knew more about the Arab-Israeli problem than any prior U.S. president. These were almost the identical words of King Hussein when I interviewed him as well. At Camp David, Carter personally wrote and rewrote several drafts of the Egyptian-Israeli agreement.

One of Carter's great strengths was that he had an enormously talented staff of State Department and National Security Council advisers. In the nine months prior to Camp David, Alfred Atherton, the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, had developed nine major points of agreement between the Israelis and the Egyptians, not only to issues relating to the relationship between Egypt and

Israel, but also on the details, or at least some of the outlines, of what autonomy would look like. Hal Saunders, who worked with Atherton at the State Department's Near East Bureau, outlined those plans in a memo to Jimmy Carter prior to Camp David. When Carter came to Camp David, Carter already had a general framework on which the Israelis and the Egyptians had agreed through intensive pre-negotiations in most of 1978. Negotiations, formulations, and phrases incubated in the months prior to Camp David Summit. It began with Begin's autonomy ideas, flowed through the political and military committee talks in Egypt and Israel, the Leeds Castle talks, and constant shuttling back and forth by American officials. When Camp David commenced, Begin and Sadat knew their red lines. Both did not go to Camp David to disappoint an American president; both wanted to leave Camp David having enhanced their own country's national interest.

Finally, a word about Carter's relationship with Sadat and Carter's relationship with Begin. President Carter comes every year to my class and lectures on the Arab-Israeli conflict; he speaks with great detail about Camp David, which is an extraordinary experience for the Emory students. Over and over, he says: My basic problem was that I trusted Sadat too much and didn't trust Begin enough. When Sadat met Carter for the first time in April of 1977, he pushed Sadat to say out loud to Carter: 'Yes, I will be willing to establish diplomatic relations; yes, I will be willing to give up this notion that I used to say that peace will not come in my lifetime.' The Americans who were there at that meeting with Carter and Sadat couldn't believe that Jimmy Carter was pressing the Egyptian president to say yes, I will, if I have to, sign a treaty with Israel. That was in April. And Sadat then made that public in a journal interview. He said, if I have to, if I get back Sinai, that is something I will do, as long as Israel considers withdrawal from all the other territories as well. Carter on numerous occasions said to me, both privately and publicly, that Sadat put faith in me to protect Egypt's interests. No matter what I did, he felt that I would never lie to him. He felt that if I told him something that the Israelis said that the United States would do, he could depend on it. It wasn't something that he had to build or orchestrate. It was a kind of an intimate sharing of trust.³ When somebody puts explicit faith in you, you are just not going to betray them. I felt the same way about him. So I thought that, after that meeting, as far as Egypt and Israel were concerned, I had a card to play in my pocket named Anwar Sadat. When the time came that I really needed some help, I could depend

³Interview with Jimmy Carter, February 19, 1991.

on Sadat. Carter understood that Sadat was working under the dual pressures of the Arab world that fully rejected his recognition of Israel while wanting to restore Sinai at the price of recognizing Israel. Carter is correct. From Sadat's advisers confirmation comes that Sadat saw Carter as an eager ally and vice versa.

Let me conclude with a comment and statement. Camp David 1978 was an agreement in which both sides agreed to disagree. The bad feeling Israelis had for Egyptians and Egyptians had for Israelis was not resolved in the middle of 1978. That transcended Camp David. That bad feeling still remained and was evident at Blair House, the talks that took place after the summit, to put flesh on the September agreements for Palestinian autonomy and an Egyptian-Israeli treaty. Those feelings of mistrust carried over into the early years of the Reagan Administration too.

The Egyptian-Israeli relationship that evolved after the Treaty was signed and after Israel withdrew from all of Sinai in 1982, and then from Taba at the end of the 1980s, was not what Israel would have wanted. Israel would have preferred to have a relationship like the U.S. has with Canada or the United States has with Mexico. But the Americans were not engaged in a moment of saying to Sadat, you've got to turn down the media, you have to stop having the Egyptian press refer to Israelis or Israeli leaders as Nazis. You've got to stop putting those cartoons in the paper that have a star on Begin's chest. Americans were not tuned into turning down the vicious verbal incitement that transited the peace treaty. American leaders did not think about making the Egyptian-Israeli relationship warmer. When Sadat was assassinated in 1981, the American priority was to keep his successor Husni Mubarak comfortable with his relationship with Washington, and if the relationship with Israel bent, so be it, it just could not be broken. Focusing on the environment of peace or the environment of non-war was not an American priority.

I believe that the Camp David Accords outlined the Egyptian-Israeli relationship and the framework for another disengagement agreement, the Palestinian-Israeli relationship. Those of you who pay obeisance or idealize or think that Menachem Begin did this most important thing in his life would have to disagree with me. You'd have to say, no, Ken, it's much more than a disengagement agreement. It was a major compromise in Begin's ideology. But in the span of things, from Henry Kissinger's disengagement in January of '74 to the Syrian disengagement in '74, to the Egyptian-Israeli disengagement in '75, through

Camp David, through the peace treaty, aren't we all looking at a process of asking the question: What does Israel do with the territories it gained in '67, and what does it get in return if it returns those territories, or should it return those territories? Israelis who were far-sighted and far-thinking understood that in 1967. They understood that these territories were going to come back to be the negotiating chips if Israel were to preserve its identity within the pre-'67 borders. We are still in the middle of that process. That is the legacy of Camp David I.

DR. KENNETH W. STEIN, William E. Schatten Professor of Contemporary Middle Eastern History and Israeli Studies and Director of the Emory Institute for the Study of Modern Israel, Atlanta, Georgia. He is the author of *The Land Question in Palestine, 1917-1939* (1984); *Heroic Diplomacy: Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace* (1999); and *Mediniut Amitza [Courageous Policy]* (2003).