LA VANGUARDIA
April 08, 2006
"An Israeli Diet: Give Up Land and Rebuild Muscle"
By
Kenneth W. Stein
ENGLISH TRANSLATION
Israel's recent parliamentary election results might argue for a
talmudic interpretation. No political party won a quarter of the 120
parliamentary seats. Without any political apparatus to turn out the
vote, the Kadima Party that did not exist five months ago, secured 29
seats. The man who formed the party, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, lies
comatose in a Jerusalem hospital.
Why did Israelis reward Kadima and Olmert? The answer is simple.
Israelis want a domestic leader to accomplish two tasks: disengage
from the Palestinians and establish a more normal life. Israelis are
frustrated with the political stalemate with the Palestinians; they
see potential for budding instability in their neighborhood; they want
to continue to shape their own future, to make their country stronger
and less vulnerable to civilian attacks. Israelis came to a broader
conclusion that controlling all the land west of the Jordan River is
unhealthy for Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. After two
intifadah's, years of brutal terrorist attacks against civilians, a
negotiating process that ended on a cul de sac, an economy that was
battered by unrest, and a Palestinian partner that wants to see
Israel's destruction, Israelis endorsed unilateral action. Israelis
voted for continuity. Olmert and his party won a plurality.
Israeli consensus is that if Hamas wants separation, they can
have separation. Put differently, Palestinians voted for Hamas, "let
the Palestinians cook in their own juices." Regionally, Israelis see
political and economic uncertainty in their neighborhood. With
implicit faith in their military and national security services to
protect them, Israelis understand that potential threats exists from
sources as diverse as Hizballah, Syria, Iran, and al-Qaeda. With all
the face cards in the negotiating deck, Israelis have concluded they
only need to negotiate with themselves.
When compared to previous elections, these were the least
exciting in Israel's 58 years. No major foreign policy issue
electrified the voting public. No major problem separated Israel from
its major patron, the United States. The international community was
on the same page on the war against terrorism. The EU and the UN were
lining up against Iran. No European countries individually, nor the EU
itself collectively, particularly after snuggling up to Arafat for
decades made any negative noises directed toward Israel since the
hamas election. There was no major terrorist attack against Israel or
Israelis in the months and days before this national election to drive
uncertain voters rightward. There was no concerted Palestinian
violence occurring on Israel's borders. And Jordan and Egypt,
countries with peace treaties with Israel were quietly urging
compromise from the Palestinians. And only one charismatic leader was
contending for the electorate's attention this time, former Israeli
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. And his Likud party was soundly
defeated. Netanyahu's usual election ploy of trying to scare the
electorate gained no traction. Other long time party leaders retired
from government, did not run, or changed party allegiances. New faces
including academics, practitioners and technocrats are to replace old,
worn, and less experienced ones.
Israelis want to give up land that is too costly to keep and
redirect expenditures from settlements to solving a myriad of
socio-economic issues. Normally, after Israeli elections, keen
competition emerges between party leaders for who gets the defense and
foreign affairs portfolio; this time the competition will unfold over
which parties hold positions in the ministries of interior, finance,
housing, and social welfare. Olmert's problems will not lie in
creating a coalition, but in trying to find the funds to meet the
simultaneous costs for withdrawal and for meeting the socio-economic
needs for pensions, bettering education, expanding mass transit, and
protecting the environment. The debate in Israel will focus on whether
non-defense expenditures should go to ameliorate conditions of poverty
or compensate 65,000 settlers or more.
What happens next? Olmert will try and form a coalition that
represents a broad parliamentary majority. In writing the coalition
agreements, understandings and promises will be made asserting
unconditional commitments to specific priorities. In the coming weeks
and months, once can expect some present political leaders to be be
sacked because of poor electoral performance. Inevitably many of the
smaller parties that rely on government funding for their educational
and social welfare needs will join the coalition initially, but down
the road when the time comes to actually withdraw from the
territories, some of these parties will leave the coalition. Their
departure will not jeopardize a unilateral withdrawal however.
What kind of pressure can Israel expect from the international
community? Very little. Israel will not be pushed to negotiate with
Hamas, a terrorist group that seeks its destruction. With the United
States election cycle gearing up for 2006 congressional and 2008
presidential elections, it is unlikely that the White House will be
drawing borders for Israel's withdrawal. Likewise, with the EU
becoming so big so fast that you need binoculars to see around the
table, and with pressing economic, immigration, and integration issues
to manage, another eye cast at Iran, Iraq, and oil needs, a concerted
European foray into Palestinian-Israeli negotiations is also highly
unlikely.
At this moment in their national history, Israelis have chosen to
consolidate their strength. They have chosen unilateralism. Sharon
left Olmert and Israelis with an enviable legacy. By comparison,
Arafat left the Palestinians with Hamas and the opposite.
Professor Kenneth W. Stein teaches Middle Eastern History and
Political Science at Emory University in Atlanta, Georgia. |