"Results
and Impact of the Palestinian Municipal Elections"
Kenneth W. Stein
Elections
for twenty-six local councils in West Bank
were held on December 23, 2004. The Fatah political
party, founded originally by Arafat and
dominant in Palestinian Arab politics for the
last forty years, won majorities on 12 of the
councils, with hamas, the militant Islamic party garnering
majorities on 7 councils. In the remaining 7 councils no
party gained a majority. In the 7 without a clear majority, hamas
and Fatah will seek to create coalitions with one another and/or with independent
councilors elected. In two of those villages/towns, hamas and
fatah ran joint slates for council seats and won. Voting for
councils in an additional 600 Palestinian towns and villages
is expected to be held next year, with most of the Gaza strip
participating. There hamas can be expected to have a stronger
following and greater representation in local councils than in
the West Bank.
The future strength of local councils and local counselors is
directly dependent upon how much money they will be able to distributed
to their constituents. That will be dependent on how much aid
donors give directly to the municipal councils and how much is
channeled through
the Palestinian Authority or non-governmental organizations.
Eighty one percent of the 145,000 eligible Palestinian voters
participated in the municipal elections. This was a number similar
to the turnout in the last Palestinian elections held in January
1996. In these elections,
there were 306 local councils seats contested. Fatah won nearly
65 percent; hamas won some 20 percent of the seats. Sixteen
percent of the council seats were reserved for women. Of the
306 people elected, women defeated men 25 times, and won an additional
21 safe seats in a quota system. According to the Palestinian
Higher Commission for Local Elections (HCLE), 49 percent of those
who voted were women. In these elections, no one contested the
fairness of the voting itself, a condition similar to the January
1996 presidential and legislative council elections where there
were relatively few irregularities. This was not the Ukraine!
In the upcoming January 9, 2005, Palestinian elections for president
of the Palestine Authority, Mahmud Abbas is the sole serious
candidate. In 1996 when Arafat was elected president, he received
80% of the vote against a relatively unknown female candidate.
In those elections, due to its relative weakness across the West
Bank, East Jerusalem, and in the Gaza Strip, Hamas
decided not to field a presidential candidate then; for similar
reasons, hamas will not field a candidate in this presidential
election either.
Turn out in the January 2005 presidential elections is expected
to be less than in 1996 or in the recently completed municipal
elections. If less than fifty per cent of the voters turn out, even with Abbas
winning as expected, it will be a slap at the traditional old guard Fatah
leadership of which Abbas is its personification in a post-Arafat Palestinian
world, and/or it will show that Fatah needs to run candidates
in the spring Palestine Legislative Council (PLC) elections who
will truly represent the interests of their constituents and
not their own personal interests.
According to David Makovksy, a senior Fellow at the Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, the elections in the spring will
be trickier for Hamas, where it will field candidates. "In those upcoming legislative
council elections, " says Makovsky, "there will be balloting in Gaza,
which has been Hamas's traditional stronghold, and Hamas also hopes to
capitalize on the image of corrupt PA officials. Hamas has been able to
depict itself as free of corruption since it has functioned until now as
a volunteer charity, enjoying all these years the luxury of criticizing
from the sidelines rather than being forced to govern. " Indeed,
hamas will have to go beyond criticizing the PA to showing it
can offer responsible leadership in providing goods and services
in a governing bureaucracy, not just providing social and welfare
services. Governance requires making compromises and choices,
some of which will not be aligned or compatible with hamas party
ideology that calls for Israel's destruction.
Between now and the the May 2005 elections, when funding again flows
to the Palestinian Authority, some of the functions which hamas has provided
to the Palestinian population, especially in Gaza, may be taken over by
PA ministries and officials, thereby undermining some of hamas's traditional
areas of popular support. Hamas will need to find a way
to participate in the political process and still curry favor
with its constituents.
If and when down the road, the PA leadership enters into
negotiations with Israel about final status issues, like Jerusalem,
settlements, borders, refugees, and prerogatives of the Palestinian
state to be, hamas can be expected to take the hard and uncompromising
political line on all these issues, and be especially adamant
in refusing to compromise at all on the issue of Palestinian
refugee hopes of returning to what is present day Israel. Hamas
will continue to want Israel's Jewish demographic majority to
disappear in favor of a Moslem Arab state heavily reliant upon
Islam as its guiding compass.
Finally, after the municipal, presidential, and legislative elections
are past, those Palestinian candidates who fail or succeed in
any of these contests may down the road decide to be candidates for the proposed
150 member Palestinian parliament to be set up, when a Palestinian state
eventually evolves. In the meantime, the multiple Palestinian election
campaigns, unimpeded discussion of public issues, and an emerging civil
society all point to the firm construction of democratic practices
free of intimidation and violence. If only the same could be said for Iraq.
Kenneth W. Stein teaches Middle Eastern history and Political Science
at Emory University in Atlanta, Georgia.